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A BETTER FINANCING SYSTEM? 
The Death – and Possible Rebirth – of the Presidential Nomination 




 THE BEST CANDIDATE: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION IN POLARIZED TIMES 





 In 1974 Congress authorized public funding for presidential nomination campaigns. Public 
funding was crucial to Jimmy Carter’s nomination in 1976 and to Ronald Reagan’s nearly 
successful campaign the same year, and continued to be an important factor in presidential 
nomination contests for more than two decades after that. But no major candidate has used the 
program since 2004. Due the program’s built-in limitations, changes in the nomination process, 
and campaign finance developments, the program is completely irrelevant today. 
 
  It has been argued that the program isn’t really needed. Although one argument for public 
funding is that promotes electoral competition the 2008 races in both parties and the 2016 
Democratic nomination were hotly contested, and the races for the 2012 and 2016 Republican 
nominations and the current 2020 Democratic campaign have had record numbers of candidates. 
A second goal of public funding is to reduce the clout of large donors, but the last several 
elections have been marked by a sharply increased role for small-dollar donors. Nonetheless, the 
current private-funding system continues to pose major barriers to entry. Although small 
donations have grown, the volume of very large donations has grown as well, and big donors, 
big-donor-funded Super PACs, and wealthy self-funded candidates have a disproportionate role 
in nomination campaign finance. 
 
 This chapter reviews the history of the presidential nomination public funding program, its 
initial impact and the reasons for its subsequent collapse. It then examines the state and local 
public funding systems that have drawn the participation of viable candidates, and increased both 
competitiveness and the role of small donors. Based on the lessons of the failed federal system 
and the successful state and local ones, it sketches out the reasons for and the elements of a re-
born presidential nomination public funding program. 
  
                                                          
* Joseph P.Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School. 





 In the spring of 1974, the 31-year-old junior Senator from Delaware, Joseph R. 
Biden, Jr., published a law review article in which he decried the traditional system of 
privately-financed election campaigns. Private financing, Senator Biden contended, 
“affords certain wealthy individuals or special interest groups the potential for exerting 
a disproportionate influence over both the electoral mechanism and the policy-making 
processes of the government.” Moreover, Biden urged, private funding poses an 
obstacle to the candidacies of “individuals of moderate means” and so was at odds 
with the “concept of American democracy [that] presumes that all citizens, regardless 
of access to wealth, have equal access to the political process.” In addition, he argued 
that private funding favored incumbents.1 To address the “Political Darwinism”2 of 
private financing, Biden called on Congress to adopt a system of public funding for all 
federal candidates.  
 Biden’s article grew out of a long tradition of treating public funding as integral to 
campaign finance regulation. As far back as 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt, in 
his Seventh Annual Message to Congress, had called for public funding of candidates, 
and in the late 1960s and early 1970s Congress began to take tentative steps in that 
direction.3 Congress created a Presidential Election Campaign Fund, with a mandate 
initially limited to funding general election candidates. In October 1974, Congress went 
further and authorized, starting in the 1976 election, the use of public funds to finance 
the party nominating conventions and the campaigns of the candidates running for 
their nominations.4 The pre-nomination public funding system differs from the general 
election program, however. The general election system authorizes large flat grants 
                                                          
1 Joseph R. Biden, J., Public Financing of Elections: Legislative Proposals and Constitutional Questions, 69 NW. L. REV. 
1, 2-3 (1974).  
2 Id. at 2.  
3 See Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: The Future of Public Financing, in DEMOCRACY BY THE 
PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 103-04 & nn. 4-5 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner, eds., 
Cambridge U. Press 2018). 
4 See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443 (Oct. 15, 1974), section 408, creating the 
Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account, chapter 96 of subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 
9031 et seq.  
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for the major party nominees who agree to limit their spending to the government 
grant. The pre-nomination program was designed to match small donations, so that 
even with public funding, candidates would still need and be able to use private 
contributions, albeit subject to a spending limit. 
 True to his principles, Senator Biden twice turned to the public funding program 
when he ran for the Democratic presidential nomination. In the 1987-88 election, he 
obtained $901,213 in federal matching funds, which were added to the $3.8 million in 
private contributions he received in his short-lived campaign. Counting loans and 
transfers from his other campaign committees, public funds accounted for about 
22.3% of Biden’s total campaign spending.5 When Biden ran again in 2007-08, he 
collected $2,033,471.83 in public funds, compared to less than $8.6 million in private 
individual contributions to his campaign. With transfers and loans factored in, public 
funds accounted for about 14% of Biden’s 2008 campaign spending.6 Biden’s 2008 
campaign also ended early, with him dropping out after placing fifth in the Iowa 
caucuses held on January 3, 2008. 
 Biden’s 2020 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, however, is 
not using public funds. Instead, the campaign is relying entirely on private 
contributions, most likely with substantial support from independent committees. In 
relying entirely on private funding this time, Biden is not alone. Every single one of the 
nearly two dozen Democratic candidates is entirely financed by private contributions. 
Nor is the absence of public funding in the 2020 race unusual. In 2016, exactly one of 
the 23 major party primary contenders – across both parties – took public funds, with 
both of the major party nomination winners – Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton – 
wholly privately funded. So, too, both major party nominees in 2012 – Barack Obama 
and Mitt Romney – and all the other 2012 contenders financed their nomination 
campaigns from private funds; so did both major party nomination winners and the 
runners-up in 2008. Indeed, the last Democratic candidate who used public funds in 
                                                          
5 Biden, Joseph, R. Jr., Financial Summary (1988), FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 
https://www.fec.gov/data/candidate/P80000722/?cycle=1988&election_full=true. 
6 Biden, Joseph, R. Jr., Financial Summary (2008), FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 
https://www.fec.gov/data/candidate/P80000722/?cycle=2008&election_full=true.  
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winning his party’s presidential nomination was Al Gore in 2000, and the last 
successful publicly-funded candidate for the Republican nomination was Bob Dole in 
1996. 
 It is not as if the public funding program was always a flop. Indeed, public funding 
was an important factor in major party nomination campaigns in the first quarter-
century after the program was adopted. Public funding was critical to the emergence 
of Jimmy Carter in 1976 and to Ronald Reagan’s near-successful 1976 campaign, 
which helped position him for his successful 1980 run. Public funding has also been 
credited with shaping and sustaining nomination contests over several decades, by 
helping to finance the candidates who were the principal challengers to their party’s 
front-runners – George H.W. Bush in 1980, Gary Hart in 1984, Jesse Jackson in 1988, 
Pat Buchanan in 1992, John McCain in 2000, and John Edwards in 2004.7  
 So, what happened? What caused the collapse of the presidential nomination 
public funding program, beginning in 2000 and culminating in its complete irrelevance 
by 2012? What have the consequences been for presidential nomination campaigns? 
Should the presidential nomination public funding program be re-created, and if so, 
how? 
 Part II of this chapter reviews the structure and legal framework of the presidential 
nomination public funding system. It tracks the declining use of public funds over the 
last two decades, and examines the reasons for the public funding program’s collapse.  
 Part III then considers whether a presidential nomination public funding program 
should be re-created, and if so, how. Notwithstanding young Senator Biden’s concern 
about the inability of candidates to raise the funds needed to mount competitive 
campaigns without public funding, both parties in 2008, the Republicans in 2012, and 
both parties in 2016 had highly competitive nomination contests, with the 2008 
Democratic race and especially the Republican 2016 nomination campaign joined by 
what were then record numbers of contestants. The 2020 Democratic nomination has 
                                                          
7 See CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE TASK FORCE ON FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS, SO THE VOTERS MAY CHOOSE . . . 
REVIVING THE PRESIDENTIAL MATCHING FUND SYSTEM 2-4 (2005) (hereinafter “CFI 2005”).  
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even more entrants than the Republicans did in 2016. Also, many of these candidates 
managed to receive significant support from low-dollar donors. Nonetheless, most of 
the truly competitive candidates have been largely dependent on large donors or, like 
Mitt Romney in 2008 or Donald Trump in 2016, their personal wealth. With the 
exception of Bernie Sanders in 2016, the candidates who relied primarily on low-dollar 
donations usually exited their races early.  
 As a result, there remains a need for public funding to counter the role of large 
donors and to help sustain the campaigns of outsider candidates. Moreover, the 
growing experience of many states and cities with forms of public funding that depart 
from and improve on the failed presidential model provide some guidance as to how 
to create a workable reformed system.  
 Part IV will conclude by sketching out the elements necessary for a reinvigorated 
public funding system.  
II. The Presidential Nomination Public Funding Program In Brief 
A. Structure 
  The presidential nomination public funding program provides qualified 
candidates with public funds by matching small individual donations. To qualify, a 
candidate must raise at least $100,000, consisting of at least $5000 in individual 
contributions – counting only $250 from any individual’s donation – from residents of 
at least twenty states.8 These numbers have not been changed since the program’s 
enactment in 1974. The program will then match on a dollar-per-dollar basis each 
individual contribution the candidate receives, up to $250 per donor. The law sets a 
spending limit – which is adjusted for inflation – as a condition for public funding and 
also caps the amount of public funds the candidate can receive to half the spending 
limit. In 2016 the pre-nomination spending limit was $48.07 million (although 
additional funds could be spent for legal, accounting, and fundraising costs), so the 
maximum grant in 2016 was effectively $24 million. By comparison, Democratic 
nominee Hillary Clinton raised more than $500 million for her nomination campaign 
                                                          
8 26 U.S.C.  § 9033 (b) (3), (4).  
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in 2016, her runner-up Bernie Sanders raised $237 million, and Republican nominee 
Donald Trump raised $350 million. Moreover, although the law provides for the 
matching of any eligible contributions received starting the year before the year of the 
presidential election, no matching payments can actually be made to a candidate until 
the start of the year of the presidential election.9 
  The law also limits how much a candidate can spend in each state to 
$200,000, adjusted for inflation, or to a specified inflation-adjusted amount based on 
the number of voters in each state.10 That meant that in 2016 a publicly-funded 
presidential contender would have been allowed to spend just $961,400 in the all-
important New Hampshire primary.11  In addition, the law limits a candidate to 
spending no more than $50,000 in personal or immediate family funds.12 A candidate 
ceases to be eligible for matching funds thirty days after he or she receives less than 
ten percent of the vote in two consecutive primaries that the candidate contested, 
unless he or she rebounds by obtaining twenty percent of the vote in another primary. 
  The program, along with general election public funding, is funded 
voluntarily by taxpayers who choose to check-off a box on their tax form that will 
dedicate a small portion of their tax liability to the Presidential Election Campaign 
Fund. The check-off was originally $1 (or $2 for a couple filing a joint tax return) and 
was raised to $3 (and $6 for couple filing jointly) in 1993. 
  As the one-to-one match and the cap on public funds at half the spending 
limit indicate, the nomination public funding program was intended to be a hybrid of 
public and private. Candidates need to raise private funds in order to receive public 
funds, and the program assumes that private funds will constitute a significant portion 
of campaign treasuries. Public funding was intended to reduce candidate 
dependence on large donors, but not fully to replace private donations. 
B. Constitutional Framework 
                                                          
9 26 U.S.C. § 9032 (6). 
10 26 U.S.C. § 9035.  
11 Presidential Spending Limits for 2016, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 
https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund_limits_2016.shtml. 
12 26 U.S.C. § 9035. 
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  In the foundational case of Buckley v. Valeo,13 the Supreme Court sustained 
both the general election and pre-nomination public funding programs, holding that 
the public financing of campaigns advances the general welfare goals of reducing 
“the deleterious influence of large contributions on the political process,” “facilitat[ing] 
communication by candidates with the electorate,” and “free[ing] candidates from the 
rigors of fundraising.”14 The Court went on to find that “public financing as a means 
of eliminating the influence of large private contributions furthers a significant 
government interest.”15 Buckley held that candidates could be required to accept 
spending limits – which are otherwise unconstitutional -- as a condition for receiving 
public funds.16 The Court also upheld the specific eligibility requirements for obtaining 
pre-nomination campaign funding and rejected the contention that the matching funds 
format favors wealthy voters and candidates.17 
  In subsequent cases – which focused on general election presidential public 
funding, rather than the pre-nomination program – the Court rejected the argument 
that candidates are somehow coerced into accepting public funds,18 but the Court in 
1985 also invalidated a provision of the public funding law that limited independent 
expenditures in support of or opposed to a publicly-funded candidate.19 As a result, 
spending-limited publicly-funded candidates have to contend with both non-spending-
limited privately-funded opponents and non-spending-limited hostile independent 
committees – although a publicly-funded candidate could also benefit from the 
unlimited spending of a supportive independent committee. 
  In 2011, in a case known as Arizona Free Enterprise -- involving a state 
public funding program – the Court held that the government could not provide a 
publicly-funded candidate with additional public funds to respond to high levels of 
spending by a privately-funded opponent or hostile independent committee.20 The 
                                                          
13 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
14 Id. at 91.  
15 Id. at 97. 
16 Id. at 57 n. 65, 107-08. 
17 Id. at 105-08. 
18 Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 445 U.S. 955 (1980), aff’d Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F.Supp. 280 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
19 FEC v. Nat’l Cons. PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985).  
20 Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.  Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011). 
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Court determined that such a “fair fight” or ”rescue” mechanism burdens the speech 
of the candidate or committee whose spending triggered the payment of the additional 
public funds, and that the burden is not justified by the interests that support public 
funding.21 Although the presidential public funding program does not have such a 
trigger mechanism, Arizona Free Enterprise limits the ability to make public funding 
more attractive to candidates and so has important implications for any re-design of 
the presidential nomination public funding program. 
C. History: Rise, Decline, and Fall, 1976-2016 
  In the first six presidential election cycles after the public financing program 
was enacted – 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 – virtually every major 
presidential contender in both parties participated in the public funding program, and, 
typically, federal matching funds constituted a significant fraction of their total 
contributions. In 1976, Jimmy Carter’s $8 million in private individual contributions 
was matched by $3.6 million in public funds. On the Republican side, a third of Gerald 
Ford’s primary receipts and 40% of Ronald Reagan’s funding consisted of public 
funds.22 The funds were particularly valuable at the start of the campaign season to 
the virtually unknown Jimmy Carter and to Ronald Reagan, who was challenging an 
incumbent president of his own party, as each had less than $50,000 on hand before 
the public funds began to flow at the beginning of 1976.23  Again, in 1980, both for 
Reagan and his principal opponent George H.W. Bush on the Republican side, and 
for Carter and his challenger Senator Ted Kennedy on the Democratic side, matching 
payments accounted for about a third of their total funds.24 The payment of public 
funds at the start of 1980 has been credited with saving Bush from financial 
elimination and enabling him to become the runner-up to Reagan and Reagan’s pick 
for vice-president.25  
  The pattern continued through the 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections, with 
both major party nomination winners and their principal opponents taking public 
                                                          
21 Id. at 736-55. 
22 MICHAEL J. MALBIN & BRENDAN GLAVIN, CFI’S GUIDE TO MONEY IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: 2016 IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT, at 27 
(Table 1-1) (Camp. Fin. Inst. 2018). 
23 See CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 2.  
24 MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 22, at 27 (Table 1-1).  
25 See CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 3. 
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funds.26 So, too, the infusion of public funds at the start of the election year enabled 
candidates who were virtually out of cash – Gary Hart (1984), Jesse Jackson (1988), 
Paul Tsongas (1992), Pat Buchanan (1992) – to keep in their races and mount major 
challenges against the frontrunners.27 In this period, matching funds accounted for a 
quarter to a third of the war chests of participating candidates.28 Things began to 
change in 1996. President Clinton’s Democratic nomination was essentially 
uncontested, but he still participated in the public funding program, and public funds 
accounted for almost one-third of his primary period receipts. On the Republican side, 
however, although the ultimate nomination winner Bob Dole participated in the 
primary matching program, as did his principal runner-up Pat Buchanan, Dole’s other 
main opponent, millionaire Steve Forbes, opted out of the program and committed 
nearly $40 million of his own funds to his campaign, thereby virtually equaling Dole’s 
combination of private contributions and public funds.29 By winning two early 
primaries and ultimately about 11% of the primary vote,30 Forbes became the first 
serious primary candidate to opt out of public funding since the program was 
adopted.31 
  In 2000, the initial crack in the public funding program began to widen, as 
George W. Bush became the first candidate to win a major party nomination without 
public funding since the public funding program was enacted. To be sure, public 
funding enabled John McCain to mount a serious challenge to Bush,32 winning seven 
primaries and 31% of the Republican primary vote.33 But Bush’s $103 million in 
                                                          
26 MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 22, at 26 (Table 1-1). 
27 CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 3. 
28 Michael J. Malbin, Small Donors, Large Donors and the Internet: The Case for Public Funding After Obama, 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, at 5 (2009), 
http://www.cfinst.org/president/pdf/PresidentialWorkingPaper_April09.pdf. 
29 CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 25 (Table 1-1).  
30 1996 Republican Party presidential primaries, WIKIPEDIA (last visited May 22, 2019), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Republican_Party_presidential_primaries.  
31 In 1980, John Connally, the former Governor of Texas and Secretary of the Treasury, ran for the Republican 
presidential nomination without taking public funds. Although he spent $11 million on his campaign, he did not 
win a single primary and secured the support of only a single delegate. See John Connally, WIKIPEDIA (last visited 
May 22, 2019), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Connally.  
32 See CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 3 
33 See 2000 Republican Party presidential primaries, WIKIPEDIA (last visited May 22, 2019) 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Republican_Party_presidential_primaries. 
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private primary contributions was more than double McCain’s total receipts; indeed, 
it was more than double the pre-nomination campaign receipts of any major party 
candidate in the preceding quarter-century.34 Although both major Democratic 
contenders – Al Gore and Bill Bradley -- opted to take matching funds, which 
accounted for roughly 30% of their receipts,35 the writing was on the wall. In 2004, 
the winners of both major party nominations – George W. Bush and John Kerry -- 
declined public funding. Each raised well over $200 million, or far more than he could 
have raised if he had chosen to rely on public funding. Again, public funding sustained 
a number of other Democratic contenders through the early primaries, and public 
funding arguably enabled John Edwards to become Kerry’s longest-lasting opponent, 
first runner-up, and vice presidential pick.36 But 2004 was the last election in which 
public funding played any significant factor in the party nomination contests. 
  In 2008, the two leading Democratic contenders – Barack Obama and 
Hillary Clinton – opted out of public funding, as did all of the principal Republican 
candidates – John McCain, Mitt Romney, Rudy Giuliani, Rand Paul, and Mike 
Huckabee. To be sure, a handful of prominent Democratic contenders – John 
Edwards, Joe Biden, Christopher Dodd, and Dennis Kucinich -- qualified for public 
funds, but only Edwards came in as high as second in any state primary or caucus 
contest. With the publicly funded candidates mostly dropping out early, the total 
allocation of matching funds in 2008 came to just $20 million, or less than 2% of the 
$1.2 billion raised by all of the presidential hopefuls in the nomination phase of that 
year’s election.37 In 2012, the public funding program ceased to play any role in the 
pursuit of the major party nominations.38 Matching funds payments dropped to a little 
more than $350,000 in 2012, with all the funds going to candidates for third party 
nominations. In 2016, the program played a marginally larger role, with Maryland 
Governor Martin O’Malley, a candidate for the Democratic nomination, qualifying for 
                                                          
34 See CFI 2018, supra note 22, at 25-27 (Table 1-1).  
35 Id. at 25. 
36 See CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 3-4.  
37 See John C. Green & Diana Kingsbury, Financing the 2008 Presidential Nominating Campaigns, in FINANCING THE 
2008 ELECTION: ASSESSING REFORM 86, 96-97 (David B. Magleby & Anthony Corrado eds., Brookings Inst. Press 2011). 
38 See Presidential Campaign Receipts Through December 31, 2012, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 
https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2012/tables/presidential/Pres1_2012_24m.pdf.  
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public funds, and obtaining a little over $1 million in matching funds, or about one-
sixth of his campaign receipts. O’Malley, however, placed a very distant third-place 
in the Iowa caucuses and dropped out of the race early. By comparison, the two 
leading Democratic contenders, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, together raised 
in excess of $630 million in private contributions.39 None of the Republican 
candidates took private funds.40 
 
D. Why Did Public Funding Fail?                
 The public funding system failed for two reasons, which are essentially two sides 
of the same coin: Public funding became incapable of providing candidates with enough 
money to cover the drastically increased costs of the major party nomination contests, 
and, conversely, it became much easier to raise the necessary funds from private 
sources. More fundamentally, public funding fell victim to the interplay of the dramatic 
changes in the nomination process, developments in the campaign finance system, and 
public funding’s own unchanged rules. 
 Turning first to the failure of public funding to keep up with the costs of running for 
a major party nomination, perhaps the most significant development in the four decades 
since public funding was adopted is the changed nature of the nomination contest itself. 
In 1972, the last election before public funding was enacted, Democratic candidates 
contested just 21 primaries and 11 caucuses,41 and just 61% of Democratic convention 
delegates and 54% of Republican delegates were chosen in primaries.42 By 1976, the 
percentage of delegates chosen in primaries had risen to 73% and 68%, respectively.43 
Those numbers continued to rise in the 1980s, so that by 1988, virtually every jurisdiction 
                                                          
39 See Presidential Table 1: Presidential Pre-Nomination Campaign Receipts Through December 31, 2016, FEDERAL 
ELECTION COMMISSION (April 7, 2017), 
https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/presidential/PresCand1_2016_24m.pdf. 
40 Id. 
41 1972 Democratic presidential primaries, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Democratic_Party_presidential_primaries.  
42 See Michael J. Malbin, A Public Funding System in Jeopardy: Lessons from the Presidential Nomination Contest of 
2004, in THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY POLITICS AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT 220 (Michael J. Malbin, 
ed., Rowman & Littlefield 2006).  
43 Id. 
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conducted a primary or caucus and used these contests to select or bind convention 
delegates.  
 Not only did the number of state contests rise sharply, but primaries were 
increasingly frontloaded. In 1972, the New Hampshire primary took place on March 7. In 
2004, it was held on January 27. In 2008, it was on January 8.  Moreover, whereas in the 
1970s, primaries were sequenced “at what now seems like a leisurely pace,”44 with major 
contests often several weeks apart, starting in 1984 and 1988, they began to be bunched 
together in ever-more “super” Tuesdays. In 2004, there were eighteen contests in 
February and another ten on March 2, when John Kerry effectively secured the 
Democratic nomination.45 In 2008, there were twenty-three Democratic contests and 
twenty-one Republican contests on a single day – and a very early day at that, February 
5.46 Although the Obama-Clinton race continued until late spring, by March 4, 2008, John 
McCain had effectively triumphed over a crowded Republican field and secured his 
party’s nomination.47  
 The public funding program has become an anachronism. Provisions that worked 
in the 1970s and 1980s are simply incapable of handling the timing, pace, and intensity 
of the twenty-first century nomination process. The small size of the grant and the low 
spending limit were not designed for a system with more than fifty state campaigns (as 
well as campaigns in the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions that select convention 
delegates). The prohibition on the payment of funds before January 1 of the election year 
fails to deal with the early dates of the first contests and their crucial importance in framing 
the race. The state-specific spending limits make no sense, particularly when low-
population (and low-spending limit) states like Iowa and New Hampshire loom so large in 
the nomination calendar.  These limits are also fundamentally at odds with the national 
scope of the Super Tuesday elections. 
                                                          
44 Id. at 221. 
45 See John C. Green, Financing the 2004 Presidential Nomination Campaigns, in FINANCING THE 2004 ELECTION, at 96-
97, 115-17 (David B. Magleby, Anthony Corrado & Kelly D. Patterson, eds., Brookings Inst. 2006).  
46 Green & Kingsbury, supra note 37, at 89.  
47 2008 Republican presidential primaries, WIKIPEDIA (last visited May 22, 2019), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Republican_Party_presidential_primaries. 
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 The law’s limit on total pre-nomination spending poses other problems. One is the 
so-called “bridge period.” With the candidates furiously spending in the crucial early 
contests, a winning candidate is likely to hit the spending limit – and be barred from further 
campaign expenditures -- months before his or her party’s national convention. This is 
essentially what happened to Bob Dole in 1996. Pushed by the intense spending by his 
privately-funded (and largely self-funded) primary opponent Steve Forbes, Dole had “to 
spend almost the legal limit during the primaries, leaving him legally unable to raise and 
spend money from late March until the convention in July.”48 This left Dole vulnerable to 
an intensive negative advertising campaign in the March-July period by his general 
election opponent, President Bill Clinton,49 who, running unopposed for re-nomination, 
had accumulated a substantial war chest that included more than $13 million in matching 
funds.50 Dole’s inability to spend during this bridge period between winning the primaries 
and being formally nominated at the national convention is one of the factors that led 
George W. Bush to opt out of public funding in 2000,51 and forced John Kerry to make a 
similar decision in 2004. 
 Of course, not every nomination fight is settled early enough to create a bridge 
period problem. The nomination battles between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in 
2008 and between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders in 2016 truly went the distance, 
with hotly contested primaries and caucuses happening as late as June. There is no way 
Clinton and Sanders could have competed as long and as intensely as they did under an 
aggregate primary spending ceiling of less than $50 million. Indeed, Sanders spent nearly 
five times that amount, and Clinton more than ten times the primary spending limit.52 On 
the Republican side, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, and Marco Rubio all spent 
                                                          
48 Wesley Joe & Clyde Wilcox, Financing the 1996 Presidential Nominations: The Last Regulated Campaign?, in 
FINANCING THE 1996 ELECTION 57 (John C. Green, ed., M.E. Sharpe 1999).  
49 Id. at 58-59. 
50 CFI 2018, supra note 22, at 26 (Table 1-1).  
51 See John C. Green & Nathan S. Bigelow, The 2000 Presidential Nominations: The Costs of Innovation, in FINANCING 
THE 2000 ELECTION 58 (David B. Magleby, ed., Brookings Inst. Press 2002).  
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above the public funding spending limit,53 even though both Carson and Rubio had 
withdrawn from the race by early March.  
 Contemporary nomination contests simply cost far too much for candidates to be 
able to abide by the aggregate primary spending limit. With the matching fund payments 
statutorily capped at half the spending limit, the program provides far too little money to 
enable a candidate to fund the kind of campaign needed to win a nomination. As one 
leading campaign finance scholar pointed out a decade ago, “the cost of running has far 
outpaced the amount a candidate is allowed to spend.”54  
 The other side of the coin is that it has become far easier for candidates to obtain 
private funds or to benefit from the spending of wealthy supporters. One not fully-
appreciated consequence of the McCain-Feingold law (formally the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act or “BCRA”) is that in exchange for placing limits on political party soft money, 
the law doubled the contribution limits for private donations, and then indexed them for 
inflation. In other words, the cap on individual contributions, which had been $1,000 per 
donor per election from 1976 through 2000, jumped to $2,000 for the 2004 election, and 
has been set at $2,800 for the 2020 election. However, the law increased neither the size 
of the contribution that could be matched with public funds nor the match ratio. As a result, 
private financing has become far more attractive relative to public funding. 
 Candidates also have become more adept at raising large amounts of private 
contributions. George W. Bush in 2000 demonstrated what the aggressive use of 
bundlers – individuals who commit to raising the maximum amount of individual donations 
from a large number of friends and associates – can accomplish. Bush recruited 226 
“Pioneers” who each raised $100,000 or more from donors who gave the then-maximum 
of $1,000 per person. These bundlers alone accounted for a quarter of Bush’s pre-
nomination funds.55 Bush did even better in 2004, with two tiers of bundlers – Rangers 
who brought in $200,000 or more, as well the $100,000 Pioneers – raising $77 million or 
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30% of his total donations.56 Obama, Clinton, and McCain in 2008,57 and Obama and 
Romney in 2012, also benefited significantly from fundraising by bundlers.58  
 The numbers just cited referred only to contributions collected by a candidate’s 
official campaign committee. Candidates have other means of benefiting from large 
private donations. A prospective presidential candidate may defer entering the race and 
engage in a protracted “testing the waters” period, using a leadership PAC, a supportive 
albeit nominally independent political committee, or a friendly social welfare organization 
to pay for travel, public appearances, fundraising, political research, polling, and generally 
laying the groundwork for a campaign.59 A leadership PAC is a political action committee 
established or controlled by a candidate that is supposed to be used to support the 
campaigns of other candidates but can be used to cover some of the expenses of the 
candidate who controls the PAC. A donor can give up to $5,000 per year to a leadership 
PAC – including non-election years -- which is considerably higher than the cap on 
donations to the candidate’s campaign committee, and, of course, donors can give to 
both. As a leading study of the “testing the waters” provision found, “[h]istorically, 
leadership PACs have been very popular vehicles for federal officeholders testing the 
waters of a presidential campaign.”60 
 Outside groups, such as 527 organizations and 501(c)(4) organizations have 
played an important role in funneling big money into nomination campaigns at least since 
the 2000 election.61 Both types of organizations take their names from provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code that exempt their income from taxation. 527s are dedicated to 
political activities; they can accept unlimited contributions and engage in unlimited 
independent spending, but they are subject to disclosure requirements. 501(c)(4)’s are 
supposed to be primarily non-electoral, but can engage in some election-related activities. 
                                                          
56 See Green, supra note 45, at 104.  
57 See Green & Kingsbury, supra note 37, at 98, 101. 
58 See John C. Green, Michael E. Kohler & Ian P. Schwarber, Financing the 2012 Presidential Nominating Contests, 
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However, even their technically non-electoral spending may focus on issues that can 
affect elections. They can accept unlimited contributions and make unlimited 
expenditures – subject to the requirement that their expenditures are primarily non-
electoral – but they are not required to disclose their donors. Initially, most of the spending 
by these outside groups occurred in the so-called bridge period and was aimed either at 
helping the presumptive nominee of the party that the outside group supported or 
attacking the presumptive nominee of the other party;62 in 2008, however, outside money 
was also a factor in the internecine Democratic struggle between Obama and Clinton.63  
 In 2012, the role of outside money in nomination campaigns took a quantum leap 
with the emergence of the Super PAC. In 2010, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit held that donations to political committees that engage only in 
independent spending – that is, spending that is not coordinated with any candidate – 
cannot be limited.64 With the Supreme Court having previously held that such 
independent spending could not be limited, the D.C. Circuit decision – soon followed by 
other courts of appeals65 – meant that independent-expenditure-only groups could both 
take and spend money to expressly support or oppose candidates without limits. That is 
what makes them “super.” The Federal Election Commission subsequently determined 
that even a group that makes donations to candidates can become “super” if it creates a 
segregated account that makes only independent expenditures; it can then accept 
unlimited donations to that account.66 
 In 2012, virtually every major candidate had a supportive Super PAC working for 
him or her. Typically established and run by operatives who had previously been on the 
candidate’s government or campaign staff, the fundraising of these Super PACs made it 
clear that the contributions they received would be used to advance the political fortunes 
of that candidate. Indeed, candidates were free to fundraise for their supportive Super 
PACs, and did so. Super PACs were crucial to the campaigns of many of the 2012 
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Republican contenders, particularly Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, Jon 
Huntsman, and Rick Perry.67 Indeed, Newt Gingrich’s affiliated Super PAC raised more 
money than his official campaign committee.68 And these Super PACs were funded by 
very large contributions: The vast majority of the contributions to the Obama, Romney, 
Gingrich, Santorum, Huntsman and Perry Super PACs came in amounts of $50,000 or 
more.69 
 Super PACs were also major players in 2016. Jeb Bush’s Super PAC raised a 
primary season record $121.1 million dollars – or nearly four times the sum donated to 
his campaign committee.70 The sum is particularly striking as Bush effectively withdrew 
from the race after coming in fourth in the South Carolina primary in late February. The 
Super PACs supporting Marco Rubio, Scott Walker, Chris Christie, Carly Fiorina, Rick 
Perry, Bobby Jindal, and George Pataki all raised more money than did the formal 
campaign committees of these candidates, and the receipts of the Super PACs 
supporting Ted Cruz and John Kasich closely approached the volume of donations to 
those candidates’ official committees.71 On the Democratic side, although there was no 
Super PAC supporting Bernie Sanders, the one supporting Hillary Clinton raised $106.4 
million, or more than a quarter of the aggregate of what her campaign committee and the 
Super PAC collected.72 
 Of course, not all of the dramatic expansion in private money funding of 
presidential nomination campaigns over the past two decades has come from large 
donations. The last several presidential nominating contests have witnessed a 
remarkable surge in the number of low-dollar donors. Federal law requires candidates to 
obtain the name, address and other information from any donor of more than $200. 
Donors who give $200 or less are known as "unitemized donors.” Due in significant part 
to the growing and increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet for fundraising, 
campaigns in the twenty-first century have raised unprecedented amounts from 
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69 See Green, Kohler and Schwarber, supra note 58, at 98. 
70 See MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 22, at 29 (Table 1-3).  
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499725 
 18 
 
unitemized donors. John McCain’s 2000 campaign was the first to turn to the Internet; 
Howard Dean in 2004 was the first to rely primarily on the Internet, and to forego public 
funds while so doing; and Barack Obama was the first successful candidate to make 
significant use of the Internet to raise low-dollar donations. Although Internet fundraising 
requires a substantial start-up investment in personnel, equipment infrastructure, data 
collection, and database maintenance, once underway it is a relatively cheap way of 
reaching large numbers of potential small donors and is certainly far more cost-effective 
than earlier fundraising targeted at small donors such as direct mail. About 30% of the 
funds Obama received in the 2008 primary season came from unitemized donors. 
Although Howard Dean in 2004 received an even higher percentage of his funds from 
small donors (38%), and Rand Paul in the 2008 Republican primaries received an even 
higher fraction (39%), Obama obtained an impressive  
$122 million in small donations73 – nearly triple what he could have obtained in public 
funds.   Obama raised even more in small donations in 2012 -- $147 million – while the 
campaign committees of most of the Republican also-rans in 2012 – Rand Paul, Newt 
Gingrich, Rick Santorum, Herman Cain, and Michelle Bachman – were also heavily small-
donor funded, although given their limited fundraising success they might have been 
better off participating in the public funding system.74 
 Small donations were also a big factor in 2016. Bernie Sanders was able to go the 
distance against Hillary Clinton, campaigning until June, with 44% of his funds (almost 
$100 million) coming from unitemized donors. Even one-quarter of Clinton’s funds (almost 
$64 million) came from such low-dollar donors. On the Republican side, a third or more 
of the value of individual contributions to the Donald Trump, Ben Carson, Rand Paul, 
Carly Fiorina, Scott Walker, and Mike Huckabee campaigns came from low-dollar donors, 
although the aggregate amounts were relative small, as these campaigns either raised 
relatively little money (Paul, Fiorina, Walker, Huckabee) or, in Trump’s case, relied more 
on self-funding than donors.75  
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 Trump’s successful campaign for the 2016 Republican nomination is a useful 
reminder that the amount of money a candidate has or spends is not dispositive of the 
election’s outcome. Three of the candidates Trump defeated – Jeb Bush, Ted Cruz, and 
Marco Rubio – spent more, or had more spent on their behalf than he did.76 Trump, of 
course, benefited tremendously from his pre-campaign celebrity and the massive amount 
of free media coverage he received.77 And he did give or lend more than $66 million to 
his campaign, which was roughly half of his total pre-nomination receipts.78 Indeed, he 
was roughly 75% self-funded during the crucial early primary phase of the contest.79 His 
self-financing was far more than he – or any candidate – could have obtained from public 
matching funds, or than he would have been allowed to spend in private and matching 
funds together if he had opted for public funds. 
III. Going Forward: Should Public Financing Be Saved, and If So, How? 
A. Why Public Funding? 
 There are reasons to question whether public funding should be re-established. A 
primary goal of public financing is to reduce barriers to entry and thereby make elections 
more competitive by making it easier for candidates to raise the money necessary to 
compete. Yet, the recent privately-funded presidential nomination contests have been 
marked by intensive competition. In 2012, there were nearly a dozen Republican 
candidates who contested one or more primaries. In 2016, there were so many 
Republican candidates that they had to be divided into two groups for the pre-primary 
debates. There were a dozen who contested at least one primary, and eight who raised 
more than $10 million in individual contributions (not counting their supportive Super 
PACs).80 On the Democratic side, although the initial 2016 field of six quickly dropped to 
two, the Clinton-Sanders race was hotly and closely contested throughout the entire 
primary season. Moreover, as of late spring 2019, there are a record number of 
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candidates for the 2020 Democratic nomination -- nearly two dozen. There has been no 
lack of competition for the nominations of the major parties when they do not have 
incumbents seeking reelection. 
 A second major justification for public financing is to democratize campaign finance 
by reducing the impact of large and powerful donors and increasing the role of ordinary 
voters. Again, as already noted, elections over the last two decades have been marked 
by a striking increase in the number of donors and, especially, in the role of low-dollar 
donors. More than 784,000 people made itemized donations – that is, donations of more 
than $200 -- to contenders for presidential nominations in 2007-08. Although that number 
dropped to 505,000 in 2012 (when there was no Democratic contest, although President 
Obama still received contributions), it returned to almost 735,000 in 2016.81 Although the 
precise number of unitemized donors (giving $200 and under) is not recorded, they 
accounted for roughly 24% of the value of individual donations to the candidates of both 
parties in 2008; 25% of the value of individual donations to the Republican candidates in 
2012; and 33% of the individual donations to the candidates of both parties in 2016.82 As 
previously noted, Bernie Sanders received 44% of his contributions from low-dollar 
donors. For Sanders, at least, participation in the public funding system would have 
reduced his ability to raise small donations and would have capped the ability of small 
donors to participate in his campaign. Moreover, in the opening months of the 2019-20 
campaign, many of the Democratic contenders have emphasized the importance of small 
donors to their campaign or have asserted that they will not turn to lobbyists, interest 
groups, or Super PACs for support. The Democratic National Committee has also 
determined that the ability to raise contributions from a large number of donors will be 
one of the criteria for eligibility to participate in candidate debates.83 
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 Despite these developments, the traditional arguments for public financing, as 
articulated by Joe Biden in 1974 – and Theodore Roosevelt in 1907 – still apply to the 
presidential nomination contests. First, limited access to funds may still operate to limit 
the ability of candidates to compete. In 2016, there was no incumbent in the Democratic 
contest, but the six declared candidates quickly dropped to two as none other than Clinton 
and Sanders were able to raise the necessary funds. Similarly, in the 2012 Republican 
contest, lack of funds drove a number of contenders out of the race early, and crippled 
the ability of Romney’s principal rivals – Gingrich and Santorum – to compete.84 It is less 
clear what role money played in the 2016 Republican race, in which Trump benefited 
enormously from free media and a number of his opponents, particularly Bush, Cruz, and 
Rubio were very well-funded. Nonetheless, several of the candidates in that large field, 
such as Christie and Huckabee, clearly lacked the funds necessary to mount sustained 
campaigns.85 To be sure, it’s not clear the current public funding system could have done 
much for these candidates. Democrat Martin O’Malley did participate in the public funding 
program in 2016, much as Joe Biden, Christopher Dodd, and John Edwards did in 2008, 
and all were out of the running early in the primary season. The quality of the candidates 
and the dynamic of the particular election matter as much as the financing system. But a 
lack of adequate candidate funding tends to constrain the choices available to voters. 
 Moreover, while the volume of small donations has grown tremendously since the 
turn of the century, the volume of very large donations has also grown significantly.  In 
2008, individuals who each donated $1,000 or more to a presidential nomination 
campaign collectively provided candidates with nearly $500 million and accounted for 
more than half of the dollar value of all donations to candidates in each party’s contest. 
For all of his success with small donors, Barack Obama received 44% of his individual 
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primary campaign donations from $1,000+ donors, and John McCain received an even 
more significant 71% of his individual primary contributions from $1,000+ donors. Indeed, 
27% of Obama’s donations ($87.3 million) and 49% of McCain’s donations ($60.8 million) 
came from individuals who “maxed out” – that is, they gave the maximum legally 
permissible amount. Obama’s receipts from maxed-out donations was almost as large as 
what he obtained from unitemized low-dollar donors.86 Moreover, as Michael Malbin has 
pointed out, the very large donations that Obama received during the so-called “invisible 
primary” period – that is, the first three quarters of 2007, long before any actual primary 
votes were cast – were crucial in establishing him as a serious candidate. His small 
donations surged later, only as he began to win primaries.87 
 Large donors were prominent again in 2012. On the Republican side, 56% of the 
value of individual donations came from individuals who gave $1,000 or more, with 40% 
coming from maxed-out donors who gave $2,500 each. The nomination winner Mitt 
Romney actually obtained 55% of his individual contributions from maxed-out donors.88  
The significance of large donors is even greater once Super PAC funds are taken into 
account. This makes sense, as an important reason an individual may give to a Super 
PAC is that he or she has maxed out on the direct contribution to the candidate. Large 
donors – actually, very large donors, using a $50,000 minimum contribution threshold – 
provided an average of 82% of nomination campaign Super PAC contributions, including 
87% of the contributions to the Romney-, Santorum-, and Perry-linked Super PACs, 88% 
of the Huntsman-supporting Super PAC, and 99% of the pro-Gingrich Super PAC. On the 
Democratic side, 91% of the funds contributed to the Obama-affiliated Super PAC came 
from $50,000+ donors.89  
  Similarly, in 2016, large ($1,000+) donors accounted for 55% of Hillary Clinton’s 
pre-nomination contributions; 40% came from maxed-out donors. On the Republican 
side, the candidates received on average 41% of their individual contributions from large 
donors and 25% from maxed-out donors, and that takes into account Donald Trump, who 
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received a below-average share of his contributions from large donors. A number of the 
other major contenders – including Rubio, Bush, and Kasich – received between 60% 
and 87% of their funds from large donors, and 36% to 72% from maxed-out donors.90 
And, again, many of the candidates – Bush, Clinton, Rubio, and Cruz in particular – 
received massive support from Super PACs, which are financed almost entirely by very 
large donors.91 Large donors often hold views on economic or social issues that diverge 
from those of average party voters,92 so that candidate – and, ultimately, officeholder -- 
dependence on large donors can skew party policies and government actions away from 
the preferences of the voters.   
 In short, despite the surge in the number of donors, and especially of low-dollar 
donors, in recent presidential elections, the impact of the very wealthy may actually be 
greater than ever. Looking at federal elections in the aggregate – that is, congressional 
and presidential elections together – one study found that although in the 2000 election 
cycle just 73,926 individuals accounted for half of all donations, in 2016, a mere 15,810 
individuals provided half of all campaign money.93 The longstanding goals of public 
financing – promoting competition by enabling serious candidates to obtain the funds they 
need to sustain their campaigns, reducing the dependence of candidates (and future 
officeholders) on large donors, and reducing the disproportionate impact of the wealthy 
on public policy94 – remain unmet by our twenty-first century private nomination campaign 
finance system. But given the unhappy experience with the current public financing 
system, can a system be created that accomplishes public funding’s goals? 
B. The State and Local Public Financing Experience 
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 Even as the federal presidential public financing system has gone into eclipse, 
states and local governments have created new programs that have had some success 
in advancing public funding’s goals.  Currently, at least fourteen states provide some form 
of public financing option for campaigns,95 and another dozen local governments – most 
prominently New York City, Los Angeles, and Seattle – have implemented or are in the 
process of implementing some system of public funding for candidates.96 These programs 
take a variety of forms, but three patterns dominate: (i) “clean money” programs that 
provide a qualifying candidate with a grant intended to fully fund the candidate’s 
campaign; (ii) matching funds programs that, like the current presidential primary system, 
provide public funds that match small donations but that unlike the presidential system 
provide funds that are a multiple of the matched small donation; and (iii) voucher 
programs, under which voters are given vouchers that have a certain value, which they 
can donate to candidates, who then redeem the vouchers for public funds.97  
 A number of these programs have significant track records. The “clean elections” 
systems in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine have been in place for several election cycles 
– Maine’s program was adopted in 1996, Arizona’s in 1998, and Connecticut’s in 2006 -- 
and have been credited with increasing the competitiveness of elections, increasing the 
number of candidates able to run for office, diversifying the candidate pool, expanding 
voter participation in the campaign finance process, and reducing the burdens of 
fundraising.98 New York City’s multiple-match system has also been praised for similarly 
expanding the number and diversity of candidates, increasing electoral competition, and, 
especially, broadening and diversifying the donor pool. New York’s experience has also 
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shown the significance of the match rate. Over nearly three decades, New York City has 
increased the match rate from 1-to-1 to 2-to-1 then 3-to-1, 4-to-1, and in the three most 
recent general elections 6-to-1, while lowering the maximum matched contribution from 
$1,000 to $250 and finally to $175.99 In future elections, the match rate will rise to 8-to-1, 
and the maximum matchable amount will go back to $250. These changes have 
increased candidate participation in the program, while diversifying the donor pool. In the 
most recent New York City elections in 2017, 84% of candidates in the primaries 
participated. The program enjoyed a high level of support, and the participating 
candidates won the three city-wide elected positions, four of the five borough 
presidencies, and 36 of 51 City Council seats. Moreover, the program succeeded in 
stimulating low-dollar contributions for participating candidates, and in generating 
contributions from neighborhoods around the city.100 
 So far, only one jurisdiction in the United States has adopted a voucher program 
– Seattle. Under the program, each Seattle resident is eligible to receive four $25 
“democracy vouchers,” which the resident may contribute to qualifying candidates, who 
may then cash them in with Seattle’s elections agency for public funds.101 The program 
was adopted by the city’s voters in 2015, and first used in 2017 for two city-wide at-large 
council races and in the election for city attorney. The winning candidates in all three 
races qualified for vouchers, as did the principal runners-up in the council races. And 
voucher proceeds accounted for a majority of total individual contributions in the council 
elections and a majority of the contributions to the winner of the city attorney race. 
According to the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission, the introduction of vouchers 
increased the number of residents contributing, lowered the size of the average 
contribution, increased the percentage of contributions coming from within Seattle, and 
spread the sources of contributions “more equitably” across the city’s neighborhoods.102  
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 Each type of public funding program has its own strengths and weaknesses. Small 
donor multi-match and voucher programs are better than clean money’s flat grant at 
increasing public participation in the campaign finance process. On the other hand, clean 
money is better at freeing candidates from the burdens of fundraising. Voucher programs 
enable each resident to determine which candidates get his or her public funds, but that 
is also true of small-donor matching. With vouchers, there is considerable uncertainty as 
to how many residents will actually donate their vouchers and when they will do so. It 
appears that in the first Seattle election in which vouchers were used, only about 4% were 
contributed to an office-seeker and most were returned just before the election, which 
could limit their usefulness to candidates.103 It may be that the differences across 
jurisdictions in the specific provisions of a category of program are as important as the 
differences in the types of programs.104 But studies of these systems do indicate that a 
properly crafted public financing program can draw the participation of viable candidates, 
provide them with sufficient funding, and increase both the competitiveness of elections 
and the funding role of ordinary voters. 
IV. Toward A Better Financing System 
 The presidential nomination public funding program created in 1974 played an 
important role in sustaining competition and reducing dependence on large donors for 
more than two decades, but it is effectively moribund. There have been calls for its outright 
abolition.105 Instead, it should be restored to life. But any new system must draw on the 
lessons learned from the collapse of the old, we well as from the experiences of the many 
state and local public funding programs. Most importantly, the campaign finance system 
must be attuned to the structure of the nomination process and the concerns of the 
candidates who participate in it.  
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 First, public funds must be provided on a timely basis. The provision of the 1974 
law delaying the first payment until the start of the election year is entirely out-of-step with 
the calendar of today’s nomination process. Payments should be available throughout the 
year preceding the year of the election. Second, and relatedly, the state-specific spending 
limits make no sense in what has become essentially a national election in which the 
importance of the early states is often far out of proportion to their voting population. Third, 
the system must provide enough money to sustain a viable campaign so that it is more 
attractive to serious candidates than the private funding route. It is hard to say exactly 
what that amount should be, but it is surely far more than the $24 million funding cap that 
applied in 2016. It is almost certainly more than $100 million, and $200 million could be 
appropriate. Of course, not every candidate should receive that much public money. The 
amount any candidate receives should reflect her seriousness as a candidate, which may 
be measured by her success in grass-roots fundraising or the votes she obtains in 
primaries and caucuses. The law could also certainly raise the initial conditions for 
eligibility above the minimal fundraising threshold set in 1974, and index that level to 
inflation thereafter. 
 Finally, candidates should not be required to accept spending limits as a condition 
for public funds. Spending limits are counterproductive. As long as candidates with 
access to their own personal wealth or the fundraising of high-dollar bundlers are free to 
rely on private funding without limits, and as long as independent groups are also free to 
raise and spend money without limits – and current constitutional doctrine indicates that 
these conditions are likely to obtain for the foreseeable future – spending limits will 
disadvantage publicly-funded candidates and are likely to discourage serious candidates 
who can raise substantial private funds from participating in a public funding program. 
Public funding can achieve its goals of increasing electoral competitiveness and reducing 
the role of large donors without spending limits. 
 That does not mean that public funding should be unlimited. A workable system 
could include a sizeable public grant – allotted on a small-donation-multiple-match basis 
– up to a maximum amount, with candidates who reach that ceiling free to raise and spend 
additional private contributions, perhaps limited to low-dollar donations. Such a program 
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would lower barriers to entry for candidates without access to large donors and provide 
incentives to reaching out widely to small donors, without handicapping participating 
candidates’ ability to compete against their privately funded opponents. 
 H.R. 1 – the “For the People Act of 2019” – passed by the House of 
Representatives in March 2019 provides an appropriate model. Proposed to take effect 
with the 2028 presidential election, it would provide qualifying candidates a 6-to-1 match 
for the first $200 of contributions received from any individual, up to a maximum of $250 
million, subject to future cost-of-living indexation. There would be no spending limit for 
publicly-funded candidates; however, the candidate would have to agree to accept no 
more than $1,000 in the aggregate from any donor. H.R. 1 contains many other specific 
limitations and requirements dealing with the financing of nomination campaigns that 
would need to be considered, and in any event it is unlikely to be taken up by the Senate 
or signed by the President any time soon. But it does lay out some of the elements that 
are critical to a successful public financing program.  
 As young Senator Biden recognized in 1974, public financing is “not a cure-all for 
all the ills besetting our present political system.”106 But a viable public financing program 
for the presidential nomination process could address the concerns about political 
inequality and wealth-based barriers to electoral competition that he raised more than 
four decades ago and that continue to remain troubling features of our political system. 
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